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In this article, I contend that the behavioural effects that tend to be labelled as errors by most 
behavioural economists, and as such have served as the justification for a paternalistic 
direction in behavioural public policy (i.e. policy intervention that aims to protect people 
from imposing harms on themselves), are in an ecological sense not errors at all. While 
acknowledging that modern societies are very different from the types of societies in which 
these effects evolved, I argue that we still cannot conclude that attempts to modify people’s 
choices in accordance with these so-called errors will improve the lives of those targeted for 
behaviour change, particularly given the varied and multifarious private objectives and 
desires that people pursue. Where people are imposing no substantive harms on others, I 
maintain that policy makers should restrict themselves to protecting and fostering the 
fundamental motivational force of reciprocity, which serves to benefit the group (which could 
be the whole society) and, by extension, most of the people who comprise the group, 
irrespective of their own personal desires in life. However, when one party to any particular 
exchange actively uses the behavioural affects to benefit themselves but imposes harms on 
the other party to the exchange, the concept of a free and fair reciprocal exchange has been 
violated. In these circumstances, there is an intellectual justification to introduce behavioural-
informed regulations – a form of negative reciprocity – against activities that impose 
unacceptable harms on others. My arguments thus call for behavioural public policy to 
preserve individual autonomy within an overarching policy framework that nurtures 
reciprocity whilst at the same time regulates against behavioural-informed practices that 
impose substantive harms on others, rather than focusing on reducing the harms that people 
supposedly impose on themselves. This would be a major switch in emphasis for one of the 
most important developments in public policy in modern times.      
 











The motivational force of reciprocity – of responding in kind to good and bad intentions 
and/or actions – can and should be nurtured by policy makers to help individuals pursue their 
own personal desires and to help public sector groupings achieve their collective objectives 
[1]. The urge to act reciprocally lies deep within the human psyche, and evolved because the 
long-term self-interest of individuals is often furthered by acting in a way that brings forth 
benefits and protections to the group as a whole. Out of this evolutionary process arose a 
social norm that favours conditional cooperation and that justifies the punishment of 
transgressors.1  
 
Admittedly, that the members of subgroups within society also often act cooperatively and 
reciprocally among themselves but to the detriment of their wider group or society at large is 
an unfortunate, and long recognised, possibility. Hume, for instance, wrote that ‘Robbers and 
pirates … could not maintain their pernicious confederacy, did they not establish a new 
distributive justice among themselves, and recall those laws of equity, which they have 
violated with the rest of mankind’ [2]. There are also risks associated with negative 
reciprocity, including undue or excessive retribution and spiralling retaliation, but, if 
harnessed in the right way, positive and negative reciprocity can both serve substantively as a 
force for good. 
 
My intention in this article is to contend that the motivational force of reciprocity, if protected 
and nurtured by policy makers, can serve to benefit individuals, irrespective of what their 
personal desires in life may be. This, I will argue, is a more appropriate policy approach than 
that which currently dominates the burgeoning field of behavioural public policy (which is, 
incidentally, one of the major developments in public policy in modern times): namely, 
assuming that people often make decisions that run counter to their own best interests, so 
legitimising policy makers to force or guide them in alternative directions. The protection of 
individual autonomy is thus central to my thesis.  
 
However, I will also argue that some people will inevitably try to take advantage of others in 
circumstances that place a high premium on autonomy, to the extent that the concept of a free 
and fair reciprocal interaction between exchange partners will sometimes be violated. In these 
circumstances, behavioural-informed regulations against harms – a form of negative 
reciprocity – might be warranted. But first, since reciprocity plays a central role in my 
arguments, I offer some further reflections on the origins of this motivational force.   
 
 
The Origin of Reciprocity 
 
Those who write on reciprocity present varied, if interrelated, explanations for its origin. 
Henrich, for example, wrote that reciprocity underpins the mutual protection that became 
necessary after our ancestors descended trees and became ground apes, and Boehm noted that 
reciprocal tendencies strengthen when individual success in a hunt is uncertain [3,4]. He 
 
1 For further discussion of evolutionary mechanisms appertaining to reciprocity, see Michael Muthukrishna’s 
article in this issue.   
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reported that when chimpanzees hunt, those that gain initial control of the carcass will share 
just enough to enable them to retain control, and that there may be reciprocation between 
givers and receivers when their relative success is reversed in the future. According to 
Boehm, compared to chimpanzees, early homo sapiens killed larger game and thus there was 
more sharing, while in hunter-gatherer societies dominance over meat was often negated 
entirely by it being shared out by a neutral person.2  
 
In political philosophy, there is a long history of debate on the cause, purpose, extent and 
form of reciprocity. That reciprocity evolved to serve mutual self-interest was, for instance, 
an important feature of Hume’s suggestion that the cooperation that is necessary to the 
subsistence of small family units extends eventually to encompass whole societies [2]. 
However, it is important to emphasise that those who attach much importance to reciprocity 
as a motivational force do not deny that humans are influenced by a mix of motives, 
including more selfishly-driven short-term egoism as well as perhaps even pure altruism, or 
that the relative strengths of these motivations vary both interpersonally and – over context 
and time – intrapersonally. It thus ought to be recognised that there is the potential for the 
selfishly egoistic driver, if one is not careful, to crowd out the notion of give and take, which 
could ultimately be detrimental to the group or wider society – and by extension to the 
individuals of whom the group is comprised.3  
 
In my own field of expertise, behavioural economists tend not to take an evolutionary 
approach to human decision-making; rather, most behavioural economists accept the set of 
assumptions that are postulated by standard notions of rational choice as normatively valid, 
and then endeavour to demonstrate that in their actual choices, people often systematically 
violate those assumptions. Given this general acceptance that rational choice theory 
assumptions are normatively correct, such violations are treated as errors in individual 
decision-making, and this, in turn, provides the justification for most of those working in the 
burgeoning field of behavioural public policy to adopt a paternalistic framework: i.e. that 
since people are error-prone in their decision-making, they need to be helped to correct those 
errors. However, if one were a little more open to evolutionary explanations for the heuristics 
that people follow when making their decisions, one might realise that there may be good 
reasons for why the phenomena that apparently cause these ‘errors’ emerged, and moreover, 
that these reasons may remain valid in modern contexts. In short, evolutionary explanations 
may put into question the validity of normative assumptions held by most behavioural 
economists.   
 
For example, most working within the field of behavioural public policy attribute present bias 
– the emphasis, oft perceived as unreasonable, that people place on the immediate moment – 
 
2 Wiessner, although acknowledging that her focus is on just one hunter-gatherer society – the Ju/’hoansi of the 
Kalahari – reported that successful hunters do preferentially give meat to others, particularly towards those to 
whom one is obligated and to close kin so as to create pleasurable living arrangements, and against those who 
are unwanted by the society (which respectively hint at positive and negative reciprocity) [5].  
3 Although we might conclude that in hunter-gatherer societies (and before), reciprocity evolved for the good of 
the group and its individual members, as societies grew and became more atomised, more opportunities arose 
for the egoistically inclined to act upon their motives with less fear of being detected. Thus, a form of social 
contract that incorporates threats of negative reciprocity – that is manifested in most of the world’s major 




to a failure of willpower. However, this tendency perhaps evolved as an appropriate response 
to circumstances where one’s future was typically uncertain and possibly bleak [6]. In short, 
if one does not perceive much of a future, why not focus upon the present? Of course, while 
this may have been a reasonable strategy over much of our evolutionary history, in modern, 
relatively secure societies, present bias can cause a range of actions and inactions that are 
evidently harmful to our future selves, from smoking too much tobacco, to consuming too 
much alcohol, to saving too little for retirement. However, it is something of a leap of faith to 
believe that people, even in modern contexts, are acting irrationally if they do not place as 
much weight on the future as most behavioural public policy analysts might wish them to.    
 
If we are not willing to take this leap of faith, it is because we cannot conclude that third 
parties are in a good position to determine that the behavioural heuristics and affects are 
necessarily causing errors in an individual’s decision-making, with respect to the individual’s 
own desires in life. As aforementioned, saving insufficiently for retirement is often attributed 
to present bias, and this serves as a justification for introducing opt-out pension plans. 
However, such pension plans may be detrimental to a great many people for various reasons. 
For instance, some people may simply prefer not to be enrolled, yet may not realise they have 
been manipulated into doing so, while an opt-out plan may disincentivise others from 
searching around for plans that might better suit their desires. Of course, it may be the case 
that the behavioural affects that evolved in different circumstances might sometimes lead 
people living in modern contexts astray, but I argue that it is better to try to educate people 
about these affects and then leave them to their decisions than to attempt to use manipulative 
or coercive paternalistic measures to move them in particular directions “for their own good”, 
when we cannot really be sure that these directions really serve their own good at all. 
 
Furthermore, in many experiments, behavioural patterns perceived broadly as irrational have 
focussed on individual decision-making, yet in the real world, collective responses to bolster 
individual security have evolved. Behavioural experiments are often ill-equipped to uncover 
these collective responses, but even with respect to those experimental designs that are open 
to other-regarding and reciprocity-motived actions (such as ultimatum games, trust games, 
public goods games etc.), such actions often tend to be viewed as irrational because they 
conflict with the dominant model of selfish egoism.4      
 
Behavioural economists typically argue that prospect theory holds humans to be 
systematically error-prone, particularly with respect to responses that are driven by risk 
attitudes. However, it may be that within the highly stylised framing of typical prospect 
theory tests, behavioural patterns consistent with that theory’s predictions are driven by 
deeply ingrained survival instincts that evolved in relation to perceptions of scarcity and 
abundance of food resources.5 I will elaborate on these points below. 
 
 
4 The economic history on what ought to and does fundamentally motivate human beings is nuanced and 
complex [7]; however, most behavioural economists and behavioural paternalists appear to accept that economic 
rationality equates to individual egoism.  
5 Nutritional needs are the most basic requisites of life. Everything else, including reproductive success, depends 
on their being met. If you are faced with two or more options and only one of those options offers the 
opportunity for you to meet your survival needs, then that option is the one that you will have to choose – in 






Prospect theory makes two main modifications to the standard theory of rational choice: First, 
rather than final assets, the subjective carriers of value are assumed to be gains and losses 
around a reference point (with the reference point generally perceived to be the status quo, 
the most likely or expected outcome, or the aspiration level),6 and with losses weighted 
roughly twice as much as gains of the same magnitude (implying loss aversion); and second, 
it assumes the subjective weighting of probabilities, such that low probabilities are 
overweighted and high probabilities are underweighted, rather than processed in their 
objective mathematical form.  
 
Both of these insights have been used prominently in policy design. For instance, in terms of 
offering people small incentives to change their behaviours with respect to smoking, exercise, 
or diet, deposit contracts – which require individuals to deposit small amounts of money that 
is only returned to them if they meet their behaviour change targets – and lottery incentive 
mechanisms – which offer a small chance of winning a sizeable amount of money if people 
meet their behaviour change targets – have both been quite extensively trialled, and their 
designs are respectively informed by loss aversion and probability weighting.  
 
The creators of prospect theory, Tversky and Kahneman, stated that the ‘most distinctive 
implication of prospect theory is the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes’ known as the reflection 
effect, which is summarised in Table 1 [8].  
 
 
Table 1: The Reflection Effect 
    Gains    Losses 
High Probability  Risk Aversion   Risk Seeking 
    (Fear of Missing Gain)  (Hope to Avoid Loss) 
Low Probability  Risk Seeking      Risk Aversion  
    (Hope of Gain)   (Fear of Loss) 
 
 
The top left quadrant in Table 1 describes the prospect theory risk attitude prediction when a 
person is faced with a large probability of a gain – for example, a 0.99 chance of winning 
£100. If an individual is offered a choice between this risky option and the certainty of its 
expected value of £99 (i.e. 0.99*100), prospect theory predicts that the individual will place a 
high weight on the certainty (in part because the subjective value of gaining £100 will only be 
very marginally greater than the subjective value of gaining £99, and in part because people 
will overweight the 1% chance of winning nothing), will reject the risky option and will thus 
be risk averse. The rules of rational choice theory assume that people will be close to 
indifferent between a gamble and the certainty of its expected value, but these rules implicitly 
assume that people are able to repeat the game many times. However, in evolutionary terms 
 
6 For instance, in standard rational choice theory, the satisfaction that a man feels for earning a bonus of £10,000 
is assumed to be independent of his aspirations, but prospect theory allows for him to feel differently towards 
the £10,000 if he aspired to a bonus of, say, £5,000 compared to an aspiration of £15,000.  
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(e.g. securing game in a hunt for sustenance over the next few days), and even today, many 
decisions may be “one-shot” (or at most, “limited-shot”). In such circumstances, one may 
quite rationally choose to avoid a risky option even if the gamble is heavily weighted in one’s 
favour if sufficient resources can be secured without risk, and conversely, one might engage 
in an unpromising risk if the alternative is certain doom. These issues will be further 
discussed later. 
 
The bottom left quadrant describes the predicted risk attitude when a person is faced with a 
small probability of a gain, such as a 0.01 chance of £100. Here, prospect theory predicts that 
the individual will overweight the chance of winning, would hence prefer the gamble over its 
expected value of £1 (i.e. 0.01*100), and will therefore be risk seeking. The top and bottom 
right quadrants can be read similarly, and show that prospect theory predicts opposing risk 
attitudes for losses as compared to gains for both large and small probability scenarios.7 That 
the predicted risk attitudes are reflected across gains and losses for both high and low 
probabilities gives the reflection effect its name, and this fourfold pattern of risk attitudes 
contrasts with that of universal risk aversion or risk neutrality predicted by standard rational 
choice theory.  
 
By asking respondents to choose between gambles and their expected values, Tversky and 
Kahneman reported some empirical support for the full fourfold pattern of risk attitudes, but, 
perhaps strangely given the importance of the reflection effect to modern behavioural 
economic theory, controlled testing of the full effect is quite scarce and, where it does exist, 
is mixed (see [9] and the references therein). One possible reason why the evidence is mixed 
is that prospect theory, in assuming that people will assess a risky option by mechanistically 
weighting the subjective value of its outcomes with their associated subjective probabilities, 
may not take into account the psychological processes that have evolved to help humans to 
deal with uncertainty in the face of perceptions of scarcity and abundance.  
 
Anatomically modern humans emerged 200,000 years ago and hunter-gathering was the 
dominant form of social organisation until the development of agriculture about 12,000 years 
ago. The consideration of well-defined probabilities (whether or not people subjectively 
weight them), as used in games of chance, stretches back 3,000 years or so, although through 
the avenues of formal education and pastimes such as gambling on sporting outcomes, the 
widespread exposure of the members of society at large to well-defined probabilities is more 
recent. It is thus not implausible that the way in which humans deal with uncertain events 
now is still influenced heavily by the processes that evolved to help our hunter-gatherer 
ancestors (and their predecessors) deal with uncertainty in their search for food, which are 
likely to have been driven by perceptions of frequency of success based on their recent 
experiences, and on the magnitude of outcome. 
 
For instance, if the likelihood of securing a good catch was high but posed a non-negligible 
element of risk, such a pursuit may implicitly have a high expected value; however, there 
would still be a chance of failure, which could have catastrophic consequences. An 
alternative strategy that promised a less impressive but still sufficient catch but with less or 
 
7 For example, in relation to the top right-hand quadrant, if an individual were offered a choice between a 0.99 
chance of losing £100 or losing its expected value of £99 for sure, prospect theory predicts that the risky option 
will be chosen (i.e. risk seeking behaviour); with respect to the bottom right-hand quadrant, prospect theory 
predicts that a choice between a 0.01 chance of losing £100 and losing its expected value of £1 for sure would 
result in a preference for the sure loss (i.e. risk averse behaviour).  
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no risk attached to it may well have had a lower expected value (in terms of calorific 
content), but if it had a higher chance of sustaining life by guaranteeing sustenance, it would 
be a perfectly sensible strategy to pursue, particularly in the absence of any facility for the 
long-term storage of meat. The focus of hunter-gatherers may well have been on securing 
sufficient food to sustain themselves over the relative short-term, rather than the 
maximisation of expected value. Conversely, if food was thought to be scarce due to 
infrequent recent hunting successes and/or modest prey, then people may have realised that 
unless they took risks there would be an insufficient catch to sustain themselves. In short, 
through necessity they would have been driven to seek risk. The hypothesis of implicit risk 
aversion in the face of abundance and implicit risk seeking in the face of scarcity to facilitate 
survival is the same as that postulated by risk sensitivity theory, which behavioural ecologists 
use to explain rational food acquisition decision-making by foraging animals in environments 
that are highly uncertain [10].  
 
The two scenarios just described – i.e. high and low frequencies of success, suggesting 
relative abundance and relative scarcity – respectively mirror the top and bottom left 
quadrants of Table 1 (i.e. aspects of the reflection effect discussed earlier), where probability 
serves as a proxy for prior frequency of success. If people similarly perceive the top and 
bottom right quadrants of Table 1 as scenarios that respectively indicate relative scarcity and 
relative abundance, then we may have an explanation for the behaviour patterns that are 
consistent with the full reflection effect. For instance, a high probability loss – the top right 
quadrant – might invoke perceptions of relative scarcity, which would provoke behaviours 
that are consistent with risk seeking. In contrast, a low probability loss – the bottom right 
quadrant – might imply relative abundance if a loss is interpreted as anything less than one’s 
aspiration levels (or a return that meets the forager’s energy requirements, in the framing of 
risk sensitivity theory). In this latter scenario, behaviours that are consistent with risk seeking 
would not be expected, because to facilitate survival (which is, in an evolutionary sense, 
one’s primary objective) they are not necessary (and indeed may well be harmful).8  
 
Behaviours that are consistent with the predictions of prospect theory are therefore not 
necessarily as erroneous as is often assumed; they are perfectly rational when one adopts an 
ecological perspective. That is not to say that risk seeking in the face of scarcity will 
guarantee survival, but that it may in some circumstances be the only strategy that offers any 
chance of survival. To further improve one’s chance of survival, however, collective 
strategies evolved over the course of time – strategies that the individualistic experimental 
frameworks used in much of the behavioural economic literature, including those employed 
in tests of the reflection effect, are ill suited to uncover.  
 
 
Signalling Cooperative Intent 
 
8 Mishra wrote that ‘… the classic finding [of prospect theory] that decision-makers are risk-averse in the face 
of gains and risk-prone in the face of losses in framed decision scenarios may be a by-product of decision-
makers seeking to minimise the possibility of experiencing a negative outcome that does not meet their needs’ 
[10]. The prospect theory predictions are actually somewhat more nuanced than those suggested by Mishra in 
this quote, but the same basic point applies with respect to the four-way pattern of risk attitudes predicted by the 
reflection effect. That said, the size of the outcome might sometimes be the dominant factor in influencing 
perceptions of scarcity and abundance. For example, if there is a good chance of experiencing what might be 
considered a gain but the gain is tiny, the perception might be one of relative scarcity rather than relative 
abundance, which may thus provoke actions and behaviours that are consistent with risk seeking rather than risk 
aversion. Thus, it is possible that the consideration of either extremely small or extremely large outcomes might 




Fortunately, experimental games have been developed that suggest that prosocial, collective 
motivations are embedded deep in the human psyche, which in turn offer food for thought 
with respect to policy design (see [1]). Such cooperative intent is unfortunately also often 
misattributed as a failure of rationality in the behavioural economics discourse. As noted 
earlier, these experiments include the ultimatum, trust, and public goods games, but for 
illustrative purposes let us here consider the so-called centipede game in a little detail.  
 
Consider two players, A and B, and four stages, I to IV. In stage I, A chooses to ‘take’ or 
‘pass’ – if A takes, he receives 80% of an initial endowment of, say, £5 (and player B 
receives the remaining 20%). If he passes, the endowment doubles in size (to £10) in Stage II, 
and B gets to choose whether to take or pass. Likewise, if B takes, she gets 80% of the 
growing endowment, leaving 20% to A, but can pass back to A if she wishes. If she passes, 
the endowment is again doubled in Stage III, with A left with the choice of taking or passing.  




Table 2: The centipede game 
    Takes     Passes   
I  (A decides)   (£4, £1)   II   
II  (B decides)   (£2, £8)   III  
III  (A decides)   (£16, £4)  IV 
IV (B decided)   (£8, £32)  Finish 
Finish     (£64, £16) 
 
 
The table shows that if A takes in stage I, he will get £4 and leave £1 to B, but if he passes 
then B, in stage II, can either take £8 and leave £2 to A, or pass, which would place the ball 
once again in A’s court, etc. If the players were to proceed to the finish, A and B would 
respectively receive £64 and £16, leaving both players considerably better off than if the 
game had ended at stage I. However, B would be better off taking rather than passing at stage 
IV (as she would receive £32 rather than £16), and thus (behavioural) economists typically 
conclude that rationality requires her to take at that point. Since A would be better off taking 
in stage III than if the game was to end with B taking in stage IV, economists tend to further 
assume that A would take if he got as far as stage III; but a “rational” B would know this and 
she would thus be better off taking in stage II. Through backward induction, a fully 
economically rational person would always decide to take. Rational choice theory therefore 
predicts that the game will end with A taking in stage I. However, McKelvey and Thomas 
undertook an experiment where 93% of players passed in stage I, 62% passed in stage II, 
35% passed in stage III, and 25% passed in stage IV [11]. It appears that in the centipede 
game, the players will cooperate, at least up to a point, to try to ensure that they will each 
benefit more than would otherwise be the case. Signalling and acting upon deep cooperative 
instincts that evolved due to their propensity to serve mutual self-interest might explain the 
decisions that are often erroneously labelled as irrational in this type of task.9  
 
9 It can rightly be contended that cooperation substantially diminished through the stages of the centipede game 
in the results presented by McKelvey and Thomas, but note that the centipede game includes a clear, defined 
final stage that incentivises selfish self-interest as the end approaches. In the real world, collective reciprocal 
exchange between individuals often has no clearly defined endpoint, and thus the incentives for continued 




If the interpretations offered in this article are correct, then when facing a situation of scarcity 
individual risk averse strategies may not secure sufficient resources for survival and thus 
individual risk seeking strategies are necessary. Of course, total reliance on such strategies 
are still likely to result in insufficiency, and, consequently, collective strategies evolved in 
those instances where scarcity was not so extreme as to render sharing a threat to immediate 
survival. Such strategies meant that those who were fortunate to obtain sustenance at a 
particular moment shared in the expectation of reciprocation when the fortunes of the parties 
were reversed. In short, individual risk seeking is borne out of necessity (cf. reflection effect 
experiments) and collective risk aversion – i.e. reciprocal sharing, a form of rudimentary 
insurance – evolved to enable us to experience a more constant level of security and to 
mitigate the misfortune to which we might be exposed if we relied entirely on ourselves (cf. 
cooperative game experiments).10 
 
With the evolution of reciprocal cooperation, there of course remained incentives for people 
to act in a more selfishly egoist manner if they thought they could get away with it. Thus, 
negative reciprocity – the threat and act of punishment – at least in part emerged to crowd in 
the broadly beneficial acts of positive reciprocity among those who might otherwise 






I have tried to suggest in this article that the supposed behavioural anomalies that influence 
individual decision-making, such as present bias – which are often deemed irrational by 
behavioural paternalists – probably evolved for legitimate reasons. The modern world is of 
course quite different from the circumstances in which the behavioural affects evolved. For 
instance, people living in hunter-gatherer societies did not have to worry about saving for 
their retirements decades into the future, but even in the modern context, a third party (e.g. a 
policy maker) cannot really know whether the citizenry would be better off by saving, rather 
than spending, in the present moment, as judged against each citizen’s own objectives and 
desires in life. It is therefore the contention here that manipulating or coercing people into 
pension plans is an inappropriate course of action. Rather, attempts ought to be made at better 
educating people with respect to the implications of saving and not saving, while leaving 
them to make their own decisions in relation to these (and other) matters.  
 
That said, I contend here that an evolved sense of pro-social, reciprocity-driven self-interest 
has emerged that ultimately benefits most people in society, irrespective of their own 
personal objectives and desires in life. A legitimate role for policy makers is therefore to 
shape society in broad terms, and our institutions and their policies specifically, so as to 
encourage, and to certainly not discourage, these reciprocal instincts. As an example, modern 
pension systems are essentially informed by the principle of intergenerational indirect 
reciprocity (even if most people might not be aware of this). That is, people of working age 
pay into the system now so that those who are already retired receive their pensions; when 
they themselves have retired, future working populations will similarly finance their 
pensions. Making people more aware of the reciprocal underpinnings of pension systems – 
 




i.e. you pay forward to others so that others pay forward to you – might bode well for the 
sustainability of pension systems.11 So long as the general structures of society are conducive 
to cooperative behaviours, there is, I suggest, no call for policies that interfere too much in 
the choices that people make (so long as those choices are not imposing substantive harms on 
others); if you allow people to be free, most have the evolved mental apparatus to seek and 
find practices of mutual benefit without the hands-on, top-down involvement of third parties 
who claim to know better.    
 
Although a third party cannot really discern if and where the behavioural affects cause people 
to impose net harms upon themselves in their passive decision-making, it is possible to 
identify fairly common circumstances where particular actors, out of self-interest, actively 
take advantage of these affects by interfering in the notion of a free and fair (reciprocal) 
exchange. By doing so, they impose harms on their exchange partners. For example, less than 
reputable financial institutions encourage people to take out short-term high-interest loans by 
emphasising the joys of spending in the moment and concealing the long-term pain of 
repayment, and online gambling companies use a gamut of behavioural affects, including 
anchoring, probability weighting, manipulations around the perception of losses, and prestige 
effects by employing (millionaire) celebrities in their advertising campaigns, to entice people 
to start and continue activities that could soon place them in very serious financial 
difficulties.     
 
Countless other examples of one party to an exchange using the behavioural affects to 
manipulate the other party could be introduced – indeed, many instances can be identified if 
one limits oneself to the food and drinks industry alone. For example, the marketing divisions 
of confectionary companies know from long experience that salience and immediacy can 
have a substantial impact on consumer buying patterns, and have traditionally paid 
supermarkets to display their products at child eye-level close to checkout counters. 
Similarly, supermarkets are often financially induced to place alcoholic beverages at the end 
of shopping aisles since it is known that this salient positioning of products substantially 
increases sales. Finally, in a recent blogpost, the money savings expert Martin Lewis 
observed that his local supermarket was selling single packs of Jaffa Cakes (each containing 
ten cakes) next to double packs (containing twenty cakes), with both pack sizes priced at 
£1.12 This is an example of what behavioural economists have termed the decoy effect, 
whereby retailers offer a choice of items where one of those items is, relatively speaking, 
obviously a bad deal, in the expectation that the other item will now appear almost too 
attractive to resist. The introduction of the decoy thus potentially impacts negatively on a free 
and fair exchange – a person might not really want any Jaffa Cakes, but with the decoy in 
place might be manipulated into buying twenty of them.  
 
Such acts of manipulation are borne out of egoism. One reason to curtail freedom is to 
prevent or punish those who might, often implicitly, use the instruments of behavioural 
science to benefit themselves through imposing unreasonable harms on others. Therefore, 
although behavioural paternalism is not an evidently appropriate strategy for improving 
people’s lives given the varied and multifarious objectives and desires that each of us may 
pursue (e.g. if a person purchases a pension plan in a free and fair exchange then there is no 
reason to prevent or covertly guide him from doing so) there is a legitimate role for 
 
11 In a recent issue of this journal, I offered some further suggestions for how governments might nurture the 
reciprocal instincts (see [7]).  




government regulation against practices that use the behavioural affects for pernicious 
purposes (e.g. to manipulate a person into purchasing a particular pension plan).  
 
In sum, I will conclude this article by reiterating what I see as the most appropriate way 
forward for the burgeoning field of behavioural public policy: specifically, a direction that 
preserves individual autonomy within a policy framework that nurtures reciprocity, whilst at 
the same time regulates against behavioural-informed practices that impose unreasonable 
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